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Holder: Lutheran Church Missouri-Synod v. FCC

A SQUARE PEG TRYING TO FIT INTO A ROUND HOLE: THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATION COMMISSION’S EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
REGULATIONS IN L UTHERAN CHURCH MISSOURI-SYNOD V. FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal Communication Commission, 1 the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal Communications
Commission’s2 equal employment regulations (EEO)3 were unconstitutional. 4 The

1

141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh’g denied, 154 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1998), suggestions on
reh’g en banc denied, 154 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
2
Federal regulation of the radio and airwaves originated with the Wireless and Ship Act
ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629 (1910). In 1912 the government banned the use of radio frequencies
without a government issued license from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. ch. 287, 37
Stat. 302 (1912). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), was created by the 1934
Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communications by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all
the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire
and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for
the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and
property through the use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of
securing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority
heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority
with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication,
there is created a commission to be known as the “Federal Communications
Commission,” which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall
execute and enforce the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
3
The equal employment opportunity program. 47 C.F.R §73.2080 (1997).
4
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 354-55. The court held the EEO regulations influenced
hiring, obliging the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (Church) to grant preference to
minorities and women. The FCC’s interest in diversity in programming did not rise to the level
of a compelling governmental interest as required under the strict scrutiny standard as
described in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (invalidating a racial
preference for construction contracts). Id. at 354.
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Church challenged the application of the FCC’s religious preference exemption policy5
and the future effect of the EEO regulations.6
The purpose of this Note is to examine the judicial review of the FCC’s quasi-judicial
powers. Part II explores the FCC’s EEO regulations and the appropriate standard of
review for racial classifications.7 Part III reviews the particular facts of this case and
the holding of the court.8 Finally, Part IV analyzes the court’s decision as a protection
of the separation of powers doctrine. 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of FCC’s Current EEO Regulations
In 1969, the FCC furthered an emerging national policy against discrimination in
employment by incorporating an EEO policy into FCC regulations.10 The FCC
currently evaluates a broadcast station’s compliance with the EEO regulations 11 during
5

In King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 61 (1974), the court held the FCC’s “anti-bias
rules will not compromise the licensee’s freedom of religious expression.” The FCC applied a
nexus test to determine exemptions. Id. A position that was not substantially connected to
the program content or a position that was connected to only non-religious programming was
not exempt. Id.
6
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 154 F.3d 487, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The panel
stated “whenever a party challenges the regulatory basis for a sanction it necessarily
challenged the future effect of the regulation.” Id.
7
See infra Part II.A-B.
8
See infra Part III.A-D.
9
See infra Part IV.A-D.
10
Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices 18 F.C.C.2d 240, ¶¶ 4-8, (1969) (Report and
Order). In 1968, the FCC determined that a station was not serving the entire audience if a
licensee practiced discrimination in employment. Nondiscrimination Employment Practices, 13
F.C.C.2d 766, ¶¶ 9, 10 (1968) (Mem. Op. and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). The
FCC initially regulated compliance in response to employee complaints. Id. at ¶ 15.
Recognizing an independent responsibility to ensure the national policy of anti-discrimination
in employment, the FCC adopted rules similar to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to determine non-compliance and other regulations to identify the minority
groups in the greatest need of assistance. In Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379 (1969), the
Supreme Court held that licensed stations were public trustees, obliging stations to present a
variety of viewpoints.
11
The EEO regulations require the licensee to exercise non-discriminatory employment
practices and to establish an EEO program:
(a) General EEO policy. Equal opportunity in employment shall be afforded by all
licensees or permittees of commercially or noncommercially operated AM, FM,
TV, or international broadcast stations (as defined in this part) to all qualified
persons, and no person shall be discriminated against in employment by such
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the license renewal process.12 In 1980, the FCC enacted procedural guidelines 13 to
screen for license renewal applications with the least successful EEO performance
records.14 A station failing to meet the processing guidelines that had skill specific

stations because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.

(2) EEO program. Each broadcast station shall establish, maintain, and
carry out a positive continuing program of specific
practices designed to ensure equal opportunity in every
aspect of station employment policy and practice. . . .
....
(c) EEO program requirements. A broadcast station's equal employment
opportunity program should reasonably address itself to the[se] specific areas:
(1) Disseminate its equal opportunity program to job applicants . . . .
(2) Use minority organizations, organizations for women, media, educational
institutions, and other potential sources of minority and female applicants, to
supply referrals whenever job vacancies are available in its operation. . . .
....

(3) Evaluate its employment profile and job turnover against the availability
of minorities and women in its recruitment area.
....
(4) Undertake to offer promotions of qualified minorities and women in a
nondiscriminatory fashion to positions of greater responsibility. . . .
....
(5) Analyze its efforts to recruit, hire, and promote minorities and women
and address any difficulties encountered in implementing its equal
employment opportunity program. . . .
....
47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1997).
12
47 U.S.C.A. § 308 (1998).
13
The proposed guidelines were strongly opposed by the National Association of
Broadcasters. EEO Guideline Modification 79 F.C.C.2d 922, ¶¶ 2-4 (1980) (Mem. Op. And
Order). The National Association of Broadcasters raised three objections to the proposed
guidelines. First, the Association argued that according to the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1980), the FCC was required to provide note and comment because the
guidelines were substantive rather than procedural. Id. Second, the FCC failed to take into
consideration the available workforce in the top four job categories making its determination
of what constitutes discrimination unfair and unrealistic. Id. Finally, the new guidelines
ignored the good faith efforts of the broadcasters to practice non-discriminatory employment.
Id.
14
The new FCC procedural guidelines created categories based on the size of the station
and then determined the target percentage of that work force which minorities and women
should represent: 1) 5 – 10 employees: 25% in the top four positions and 50% in overall work
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positions could supplement its application with census information or other data to
demonstrate a lack of available minorities and women with the requisite skills.15
In 1987, the FCC shifted the focus of its EEO regulations from a results-based
approach to an efforts-based approach.16 In effect, the shift was nothing more than
illusory. While the new regulations required a station to describe in detail its plan to
accomplish the hiring goals;17 the regulations still required a broadcast station to meet
the results-based numerical goals of minority representation in its workforce. 18 The
FCC contends its current EEO regulations are efforts-based and are designed to deter
discrimination and promote programming that reflects the viewpoints of minorities and
women.19
B. The Standard of Review for FCC’s EEO Regulations
The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the appropriate standard of
review for cases regarding race classifications.20 In Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC,21

force; 2) 11 – 49 employees: 50% in the top four positions and the overall work force; 3) Over
50 employees automatically receive and in depth review; 4) Less than 5 employees are exempt
from filing. EEO Guideline Modifications, 79 F.C.C.2d 922, ¶¶ 5-6 (1980).
A failure to achieve the listed percentages alerted the FCC to stations needing further
review, although it did not automatically indicate the presence of discrimination. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.
The FCC conducted an in depth review after examining the numerical data and other factors.
Id.
A station meeting the processing guidelines established a prima facie showing of nondiscrimination in employment also referred to as the “zone of reasonableness.” Bilingual
Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 627, n.15 (1978).
15
EEO Guideline Modifications, 79 F.C.C.2d 922,¶ 29 (1980).
16
The FCC adopted a two step approach to evaluate a station’s compliance with the EEO
regulations. EEO Rules, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967, ¶ 48 (1987) (Report and Order). The initial evaluation
focuses on the station’s renewal application, complaints filed against the station and any
other information pertaining to the station’s EEO program and policies. Id. A station would
be required to submit additional information regarding specific areas of its EEO program that
an initial evaluation found unsatisfactory. Id.
17
A station can have a proper EEO plan in place and still be in violation of the EEO
regulations for failure to meet the numerical goals. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v.
F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344, 351-54 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The FCC’s EEO regulation is still a results-based
approach with an additional reporting requirement of what plans the station has in place to
accomplish the required results. Id.
18
EEO Rules, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967, ¶ 48 (1987) (Report and Order).
19
EEO Forfeiture Guidelines, 11 F.C.C.R. 5154, ¶¶ 7-12 (1996) (Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking); see also EEO Rule and Policies, 13 F.C.C.2d 6322, ¶ 9 (1998) (Order and
Policy Statement).
20
The Court has applied both a strict scrutiny and an intermediate standard for review of
governmental race classifications. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226
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the Court upheld congressional power to adopt an affirmative action plan which did not
remedy past discrimination.22 Applying an intermediate standard of review,23 the Court
characterized the FCC minority program as benign24 and recognized a link between
minority ownership and programming diversity.25
(1995). A strict scrutiny standard is met if there is a compelling governmental interest and a
narrowly tailored means to achieve the government’s objectives. Id. An intermediate
standard is met when an important government interest within Congress’ power is
substantially related to the achievement of the government’s objectives. Metro Broadcasting
Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Until 1990, the Supreme Court decisions regarding race classifications “taken together . . .
[led] to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race, ha[d] the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224;
see also Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion
invalidating a state medical school admission policy which reserved places for minority
students); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion invalidating a
school’s race-based determinations of priorities for a lay-off of teachers); and City of
Richmond v. Cronson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a state apportionment to minority
construction businesses); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (validating the minority
business enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977).
21
497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
22
The Court reviewed two minority preference policies: 1) an enhancement award for
minority applicants in competitive proceedings for new licenses; and 2) minority distress
sales which permitted a limited number of current broadcast stations to sell their license
before they were denied renewal. Id. at 547-48. For an indepth discussion of Metro, see
Kathleen Ann Kirby, Shouldn’t the Constitution Be Color Blind? Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC Transmits A Surprising Message on Racial Preferences, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 406
(1991) (“The Court, for the first time, upheld Congress’ power to adopt affirmative action
plans to promote racial and ethnic diversity rather than simply to remedy past
discrimination.”).
23
The Court held:
. . . that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress- even if the
measures are not remedial in the sense of being designed to comp ensate victims of
past government or societal discriminations- are constitutionally permissible to the
extent they serve important government objectives within the power of Congress
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
Metro, 497 U.S. at 564-65 (emphasis added); cf. Mary Tabor, Encouraging “Those Who
Would Speak Out With Fresh Voice” Through The Federal Communications Commission’s
Minority Ownership Policies, 76 IOWA L. REV. 609, 639 (1991) (claiming the intermediate level
standard adopted by the Court in Metro did not go far enough because the Court left
unanswered the constitutionality of affirmative action programs with less congressional
support).
24
Metro, 497 U.S. at 564-65. The Court labeled the FCC policies as benign “confident that
an examination of the legislative scheme and its history . . . will separate benign measures
from other types of racial classification.” Id. at 565, n.12 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
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Justice O’Connor’s dissent26 argued that the majority opinion strayed from the
traditional approach27 of reviewing racial classifications as permissible only if they are
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest,28 and that only a
420 U.S. 636, 648, n.16) (1975)). The Court justified its classification by stating “the concept
of benign race-conscious measures –even those with at least some nonremedial purposes—is
as old as the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 656, n.12; see also Ken Feagins, Wanted—
Diversity: White Heterosexual Males Need Not Apply, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 4 (1994)
(describing the difference between a benign act and discriminatory act.). A benign act
provides an individual access to a benefit without depriving another. Id. A discriminatory
act is distinguished as denying an opportunity to an individual in order to grant it to another.
Id. But see Metro, 497 U.S. at 609 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that “[b]enign racial
classification is a contradiction in terms.”). Justice Kennedy also dissented stating
“[a]lthough the majority is ‘confident’ that it can determine when racial discrimination is
benign . . . it offers no explanation as to how it will do so.” Id. at 635 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Kennedy’s dissent, “[p]olicies of racial separation and
preference are almost always justified as benign, even when it is clear to any sensible
observer that they are not.” Id.
25
A “broadcasting industry with representative minority participation will produce more
variation and diversity than one whose ownership is drawn from a single racially or ethnically
homogenous group.” Metro, 497 U.S. at 579. The nexus between minority ownership and
diversity in programming is based on the premise that “a race-neutral means could not
produce adequate broadcasting diversity.” Id. at 589. A determination that this nexus does
exist is “revealed by the historical evolution of current federal policy, both Congress and the
Commission have concluded that the minority ownership programs are critical means of
promo ting broadcast diversity . . . [the Court] give[s] great weight to their joint
determination.” Id. at 579. The existence of a nexus is a predictive judgment because “there
is no ironclad guarantee that each minority owner will contribute to diversity.” Id. In Justice
O’Connor’s dissent, she describes the nexus between minority ownership and program
diversity as valid only to the degree that minority owned stations provide the viewpoint the
FCC determines is lacking. Id. at 618-19 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
26
Id. at 611-12 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority opinion is without support
from precedent and the current FCC minority preference policies fail under a strict scrutiny
and intermediate standard of review).
27
The Court stated:
‘Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional
guarantees.’ There are two prongs to this examination. First, any racial
classification ‘must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.’ Second, the
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be ‘narrowly tailored to
the achievement of that goal.’
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (citations omitted).
28
Metro, 497 U.S. at 612 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Modern equal protection doctrine
has recognized only one such [compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial
discrimination.”).
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remedial race classification would require the more demanding strict scrutiny
standard.29 Justice O’Connor concluded that the majority opinion upholding the FCC
minority preference policies lacked precedential support.30
Five years later, in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 31 the Court overruled
Metro32 and required that race classifications be reviewed under a strict scrutiny
standard.33 The majority explored the development of the strict scrutiny and
intermediate standard of review for state and federal governmental race
classifications.34 The decision in Adarand renders the FCC’s EEO regulations
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny standard of review. Metro’s intermediate
standard of review was no longer appropriate. 35

29

Id. at 607 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Contra, Akosua Barthwell Evans, Are Minority
Preferences Necessary? Another Look at the Radio Broadcast Industry, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 380, 411 (1990) (“Minority preference policies are necessary to address past
discrimination and ensure that minority viewpoints are represented on the public airwaves.”);
see Theresa Brunson, The Federal Communication Commission’s Commitment to
Regulating Equal Employment Opportunity in the Broadcast Industry, 1 HOW . SCROLL 100
(1993) (finding that FCC failure to enforce EEO regulations resulted in a history of sanctioned
discrimination for minorities in the broadcast industry).
30
In City of Richmond v. Cronson, the Court held that a remedy for societal discrimination
does not meet compelling interest of strict scrutiny. 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (invalidating a
state apportionment to minority construction businesses).
31
515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand, the lowest bidding sub-contractor was passed over for
a minority sub-contractor. Id. at 200. The Court held that racial classifications of this type
must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 226.
32
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
33
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. “[A]ll racial classification, imposed by whatever Federal . . .
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. . . . [S]uch classifications
are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
government interests. To the extent [Metro] is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled.”
Id.
34
The majority in Adarand focused on the propositions of skepticism, consistency and
congruence from past cases to hold the decision in Metro represented “a significant
departure from what came before it.” Id at 225-27. The Court’s skepticism of racial
classifications, need for consistency in application of equal protection and congruency
between the State and Federal protection led to the conclusion that a justification for
subjecting any person to unequal treatment under racial classifications must be “under the
strictest judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 223-24. However, according to Justice Stevens’ dissenting
opinion, “[i]nstead of deciding this case in accordance with controlling precedent, the Court
today delivers a disconcerting lecture about the evils of governmental racial classifications.”
Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35
See id. at 225-29.
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After Adarand, the Department of Justice (D.O.J.) issued a memorandum to provide
guidance to Federal agencies.36 The D.O.J. Memorandum justified the use of race as
operational and consistent with the compelling governmental interest required in
Adarand. 37 The FCC reexamined its EEO regulations and concluded its efforts-based
approach did not trigger an Adarand strict scrutiny review.38
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
On September 29, 1989, the Lutheran Church Missouri-Synod filed an application
with the FCC for renewal of its license. 39 The FCC ruled that the application was
deficient,40 and requested supplemental information regarding the recruitment of
minorities and women.41 The NAACP petitioned to deny renewal42 alleging that the
36

Associate Attorney General John R. Schmidt, Post-Adarand Guidance on Affirmative
Action in Federal Employment (Feb. 29, 1996), reprinted in DAILY LAB . REP . (BNA) No. 43, at
D-31 (Mar. 5, 1996) [hereinafter D.O.J. Memorandum].
37
D.O.J. Memorandum, supra note 36, at § 2, ¶ 5. A compelling interest that may be
justified as operational providing that “decisionmakers will be exposed to the greatest
possible diversity of perspectives.” Id. But see Kingsley R. Browne, Non-remedial
Justifications for Affirmative Action In Employment; A Critique of the Justice Department
Position, 12 LAB . LAW . 451 (1997). Neither the Congress nor Supreme Court justifies racial
classification with efficiency concerns. Id. at 473. “Contrary to the Justice Department,
employers may not circumvent this regime by the simple artifice of labeling classifications
based on operational justifications ‘affirmative action.’ ” Id.
38
EEO Forfeiture Guidelines, 11 F.C.C.R. 5154, ¶¶ 13-15 (1996) (Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking). The FCC decided that an Adarand review is inapplicable if the use of
race is limited to expanding an existing job pool. Id. EEO regulations are limited to outreach
and recruitment not requiring a certain number of minority employees. Id.; see Federal Power
Comm’n v. NAACP, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
The [FCC] has adopted regulations dealing with the employment practices of its
regulatees . . . . These regulations can be justified as necessary to enable the FCC to
satisfy its obligation under the Communications Act of 1934 . . . to ensure its
licensee’s programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups.
Id. at 670, n.7.
39
The application was submitted per 47 U.S.C. § 308 (1998). The license period was
February 1, 1983 to February 1, 1990. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 10 F.C.C.R. 9880, ¶
73, (1995) (Initial Decision) [hereinafter Initial Decision].
40
The Church’s original application indicated only six hires, two white males and four
white females during the renewal year. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 9 F.C.C.R. 914, ¶ 7,
(1994) (Hr’g Designation and Order) [hereinafter HDO]. The Church, citing human error,
corrected the hiring information for the license period. Id. at ¶ 12. The Church actually hired
ten full-time and four part-time positions. Id.
41
Although the Church apparently sent referral letters to employment agencies that
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Church EEO program failed to indicate contact with minority organizations,43 failed to
hire or recruit a minority employee during the previous license period,44 and employed
only one full-time minority.45 The Church responded with a defense of their EEO
program and a policy of non-discrimination.46
B. Procedural History
The FCC renewed the Church license47 with reporting sanctions 48 but fined the
Church $25,000.00 for its lack of candor.49 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
handled referrals of minorities and women, the Church did not receive any referrals from these
organizations. Id. at ¶ 8.
42
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP), petitioned to
deny renewal per 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1990). See Astroline Communications Co. v. FCC, 857 F.2d
1556 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The NAACP met the requirements of the two-part test in 47 U.S.C. §
309(d)(1),(2) (1990), to determine if an intervening party has standing. Id. at 1561. First, the
party submits affidavits to show that it is in the public’s interest to deny the station’s
application for renewal. Id. The FCC determines if a prima facie case to deny the application
exists. Second, the FCC decides if there is a substantial issue of fact to support a hearing. Id.
The NAACP made specific allegations of fact and stated that Rev. James F DeClure was a
minority listener who would be seriously aggrieved if the NAACP petition was not granted.
HDO, 9 F.C.C.R. 914 at ¶¶ 2, 3. The NAACP was accepted as an interested party. Id.
43
47 C.F.R. §73.2080(b)(3) (1997) (requiring a broadcast station to communicate its EEO
policy to sources of qualified applicants and to maintain continual recruiting assistance with
these sources). A subsequent section suggests enlisting the aid of minority organizations for
referrals. §73.2080(c)(2).
44
HDO, 9 F.C.C.R. 914 at ¶ 7.
45
NAACP argues the Church should not get minority credit for the Hispanic employee.
The FCC defines minority as “Blacks not of Hispanic origin, Asians or Pacific Islanders,
American Indians or Alaskan Natives and Hispanics” EEO Rules and Policies, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967
at App. C, ¶ 1.
46
HDO, 9 F.C.C.R. 914 at ¶¶ 10, 11. The Church stated three mitigating circumstances to
defend their EEO program: 1) large receipt of write in applications; 2) a reciprocal arrangement
with Concordia Seminary that in exchange for rent free accommodations the Church extends
positions to seminary students; and 3) management turnover. Id. Church supplied statistical
information per processing guidelines. Data showed 5% of the Lutherans in Missouri are
minorities, a listeners poll indicated that 3.7% are black and the Church reasoned .01% of the
listening area are minorities with classical music training. Id. at ¶ 11.
47
Id. at ¶ 38. The FCC designated the Church’s application for a full hearing. Id. at ¶ 32;
see also Initial Decision, 10 F.C.C.R. 9880 at ¶¶ 252-61. The ALJ determined that during the
period between Feb. 1, 1983 and Aug. 3, 1987, the Church had flawed but acceptable
affirmative action efforts. Id. at ¶ 254. Between August 3, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1990, the Church
was not in compliance with 47 C.F.R. 73.2080 (1987). Id. However, there was not “one
scintilla” of evidence that the Church had in fact discriminated against minorities and the ALJ
determined a denial of the license was not warranted and recommended a forfeiture of fifty
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Court of Appeals held the FCC regulations unconstitutional50 and remanded the case to
the FCC for a determination on whether the Commission “ha[d] authority to promulgate
an employment non-discrimination rule.”51
C. District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The issue before the court was the constitutionality of the EEO regulations
as applied to the Church’s renewal application.52 The court held that the FCC’s
“diversity in programming”53 interest failed the Adarand strict scrutiny test54 that is
required for all government racial classifications.55 The court held that the EEO

thousand dollars and reporting sanctions. Id. The FCC issued a reporting sanction and
reduced the fine to twenty-five thousand dollars. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 12
F.C.C.R. 2152 (1997) (Mem. Op. and Order) [hereinafter MO&O].
48
The Church sanction was to submit reports annually over the next 3 years containing: 1)
a list of all job applicants and hires, indicating their referral or recruitment source, job title,
part-time or full-time status, date of hire, sex, and race or national origin; 2) a list of all
employees, indicating job title, sex, and race; and 3) a narrative statement detailing the
station’s efforts to recruit minorities. MO&O, 12 F.C.C.R. 2152 at ¶¶ 23-24.
49
Id. The Church displayed a lack of candor regarding a classical music requirement for
applicants and the description of its renewal program. Id. at ¶ 25.
50
See infra Part III.C.
51
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The FCC’s
petition to the court for a rehearing was denied. 154 F.3d 487 (D.C.Cir. 1998), suggestions on
reh’g en banc denied, 154 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1998). A petition for a rehearing en banc must
be filed fourteen days after the decision. See Michael Botein, Comment, Judicial Review of
FCC Action, 13 CARDOZO A RTS AND ENT . L.J. 317, 340-41 (1995). Such a hearing is disfavored
by the court and “is an extremely rare form of relief to secure.” Id.
52
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d. at 356. The Court only decided whether the affirmative
action portion of the EEO regulations violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Church raised
issues of interference with their religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Act and the
Free Exercise Clause, which the court did not think prudent to address. Id. The Church’s
arguments that: 1) the FCC decision violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment;
and 2) the FCC’s failure to reexamine the King’s Garden religious exemption policy were not
properly before the court. Id. at 349 n.6.
53
See id. at 354-55. The FCC relied on the intermediate standard used in Metro, arguing
that diversity in programming was an important interest and therefore, constitutional. Id. For
a discussion of the standard used in Metro, see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
54
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995). The Court established a
two prong test for strict scrutiny review of racial classifications. First, the basis for the racial
classification must be a compelling government interest. Id. Second, the interest must be
narrowly tailored to serve the interest. Id.
55
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d. at 356. (“The regulations could not pass the substantial
relation of intermediate scrutiny, let alone the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.”).
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regulations obligated the Church to “grant some degree of preference to minorities in
hiring.”56
The court focused on the inherent inconsistency of the FCC’s policy toward
religious exemptions,57 and its interest in promoting diversity in programming. Under
the FCC’s current regulations, the Church could not use religious preferences to hire a
secretary58 but the Church was required to use racial preferences to recruit and hire the
same secretarial position to further the interest of diversity in programming.59 The
court refused to accept the FCC’s proposition that there exists a link between the EEO
regulations and the FCC’s interest in programming diversity.60
Dissent’s Reasoning from Denial of Rehearing En Banc61

D.

Chief Justice Edwards 62 suggested a rehearing to review the court’s creation of a
constitutional issue where he felt none existed.63 He argued that the correct standard
of review was the intermediate standard used in Metro64 stating the standard was still
good law “and not overruled by the Court in Adarand.”65 In a separate dissent, Judge
56

Id. at 351. The processing guidelines, serve as a quota or safe harbor, which, after a
licensee’s failure to meet the numerical guidelines, triggers a review for discriminatory
recruiting and hiring practices. Id. at 352-54; see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
57
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the nexus test as applied to
determine exemptions).
58
King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 61 (1974). Under the King’s Garden policy, a
secretarial position is not substantially connected to the religious programming of a station
and therefore does not qualify as a religious exemption from the EEO regulation. Id.
59
The court stated “[t]he FCC would thus have us believe that low-level employees
manage to get their racial viewpoint on the air but lack the influence to convey their religious
views. That contradiction makes a mockery out of the Commission’s contention
that its EEO program requirements are designed for broadcast diversity purposes.” Lutheran
Church, 141 F.3d at 356.
60
Id.
61
See infra, notes 63, 65 and accompanying text.
62
Harry T. Edwards, Chief Justice of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
63
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 154 F.3d. 494, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Chief
Justice Edwards argued the court mis -characterized the FCC good faith attempt to ensure
against racial discrimination in the broadcast industry. Id. He characterized the EEO
regulation as an encouragement, not an obligation, to consider minority applications. Id. He
found the FCC’s use of statistical information as one, of several factors, used to foster
internal processing of renewal applications. Id. “The guidelines reasonably can be
understood to provide nothing more than a method for allocating the agency’s investigative
resources.” Id. at 499.
64
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
65
Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d at 499. The Chief Justice further stated “[b]y forcing the
square peg of the Commission’s regulations into the round hole of the Adarand analysis,
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Tatel stated that the decision takes the holding of Adarand “where no court has yet
taken it.”66
V. ANALYSIS
The Adarand decision left several questions regarding the FCC and its EEO
regulations unanswered including the amount of judicial deference the Supreme Court
of the United States would give to this type of congressional act.67 The decision in
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal Communication Commission68 suggests
the answer is very little. 69 This analysis will focus on three areas: 1) the FCC’s
authority as an obstacle for judicial review in the Lutheran Church70 case;71 2) judicial
review as a protection of the separation of powers;72 and 3) the future of the EEO
regulations.73
A.

The FCC’s Authority as an Obstacle for Judicial Review

The FCC derives authority to regulate the broadcast industry from the
Communications Act of 1934.74 The scope of the FCC’s authority is ambiguously

which applies only to racial classifications, the panel decision disserves the development of
antidiscrimination doctrine. This serious misprision of the issues calls for rehearing en banc.”
Id.
66
Id. at 500. Justice Tatel argued that nothing in the Adarand case or any other
affirmative action cases justifies the extension of a strict scrutiny review of outreach and
recruitment programs. Id. at 500-01. He suggests that the court require something more than
“unsupported speculation” before applying strict scrutiny. Id. at 503.
67
S. Jenell Trigg, Comment, The Federal Communications Commission’s Equal
Employment Opportunity and the Effect of Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 4 COM L.
CONSPECTUS 237, 251-254 (1996) (suggesting Adarand did not completely overrule Metro
leaving questions regarding the amount of judicial deference the Supreme Court of the United
States will apply to affirmative action legislation). The author classifies the critical unresolved
question as whether a diversity of voices interest rises to the level of a compelling
government interest. Id. at 252-53.
68
141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
69
Robert S. Whitman, Affirmative Action on Campus: The Legal and Practical
Challenges, 24 J.C. & U.L. 637, 649-50 (1998) (“Lutheran Church illustrates the difficulty of
defending affirmative action under a strict scrutiny regime. And because the D.C. Circuit
Court decided it, the decision could foretell even greater hostility toward Federal-governmentsponsored affirmative action programs.”).
70
141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
71
See infra Part IV.A.
72
See infra Part IV.B.
73
See infra Part IV.C.
74
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1991).
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described as the public interest.75 Congressional delegation of authority under public
interest “leaves the widest possible area of judgement and . . . discretion to the
administrator.”76 In his dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 77 Justice Scalia stated
“[w]hat legislative standard . . . can be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we
have repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a ‘public interest’ standard?”78 In Lutheran
Church, 79 the court stated “the government’s formulation of the interest seems too
abstract to be meaningful.”80
In Lutheran Church, the FCC attempted to use the public interest standard to expand
the scope of its authority and retain exclusive control over the renewal of the Church’s
license. 81 The FCC issued a modified policy statement citing Lutheran Church after
oral arguments were presented before the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals.82 However, the court refused to remand the issues in the case regarding the
FCC’s newly modified interpretation of religious exemptions under King’s Garden. 83
75

In Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134,
138, n. 2 (1940), the Court adopted the FCC’s interpretation that the public interest standard is
comparative and flexible:
Since the beginning of regulation . . . comparative considerations have governed the
application of standards of ‘public convenience, interest, or necessity’ laid down by
the law . . . the commission desires to point out that the test . . . becomes a matter of
a comparative and not an absolute standard when applied to broadcasting stations .
. . . The emphasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the convenience, and
the necessity of the listening public, and not on the interest . . . of the individual
broadcaster.
Id.; see also National Broadcasters v. U.S. Columbia Broadcasting System, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)
(holding the power of the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934 was not limited to
regulating technical matters). The Court recognized that the Congress purposefully left the
scope of authority vague to allow the authority of the FCC to grow and adjust with the “fluid
and dynamic” nature of radio. Id. at 219. “The Act gave the Commission not niggardly but
expansive powers.” Id.; see also Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 379 (1969).
76
Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court’s Separation of
Powers Wonderland, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 595 (1990).
77
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
78
Id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79
141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
80
Id. at 354.
81
Two months after the oral arguments, the FCC moved the court to grant a partial remand
of the issues regarding its King’s Garden policy. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
82
EEO Rules and Policies, 13 F.C.C.R 6322 at ¶ 9. “Religious broadcasters will also remain
subject to [the Commission’s] rules . . . requiring broadcast licensees . . . to ensure equal
employment opportunity . . . .
We hereby emphasize this continuing obligation
notwithstanding any suggestion to the contrary in Lutheran Church . . . appeal pending.” Id.
83
Id. at ¶ 5. The FCC issued a modification of the King’s Garden policy stating “the
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One reason for the refusal was the FCC Commissioner’s unwillingness to make any
recommendations to the court on the likely outcome “concerning the merits of the case
on remand.”84
In response to the FCC’s modified policy statement and requested remand, the court
observed “the Commission has on occasion employed some rather unusual legal tactics
when it wished to avoid judicial review, but this ploy may well take the prize.”85 The
court’s refusal to remand the case frustrated the FCC’s attempt to retain complete
control over the case procedurally, and substantively over the EEO regulations.
The FCC raised the issue of the court’s denial to remand in its petition for rehearing
en banc.86 The panel upheld the remand denial relying, on both the Church’s opposition
to a remand87 and on the non-binding nature of the newly modified policy statement.88
The FCC was unsuccessful in its attempt to assert its authority as a means to block
judicial review.

Commission’s policy should be expanded to permit religious broadcasters to establish
religious belief or affiliation as a job qualification for all stations.” Id. at ¶ 3.
84
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 348-49. Counsel for the FCC originally stated that the
modified policy statement would be applied retroactively to the Church’s license renewal and
the present sanctions would be vacated. Id. In a “letter [FCC]’s own counsel filed with the
court noting that the Commissioner thought it inappropriate for the motion to remand to bind
the Commissioners to vote in a particular way and thus wished to make no representations
about what sort of order should ultimately be adopted.” Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d 487, 490
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The panel suggests that even under the modified policy statement the
Church would be in violation of the EEO regulations stating “the Church would thus still
remain obligated to exercise racial preferences within the pool of Lutheran applicants under
the Commission’s EEO rules.” Id.
85
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d. at 349. “[W]hatever an agency’s choice among various
interpretive options may be based upon, it should not be based upon the desire to win a
particular lawsuit.” Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 519-20 (1989). Chief Justice Scalia further suggests that deference
should only apply “to agency determinations made (with sufficient formality) in the regular
course of the agency’s business, and not in litigation.” Id.
86
Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d 487, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The FCC raised two additional
arguments: 1) the court was obliged to decide the Religious Freedom Reform Act issue before
the Fifth Amendment issue; and 2) the court should not have applied a strict scrutiny
standard. Id.
87
Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d 487, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998). (“If the Church had supported
the Commission’s motion in this case, we might have had a remand.”); see Botein, supra note
51, at 340-34 (refering to the rehearing on banc as a “rare form of relief”).
88
The FCC argued the policy statement was a binding order that grew out of a rulemaking.
Id. at 489. The court responded “we confess that we simply have no idea as to in what
administrative law category the Commission policy statement ‘order’ falls.” Id.
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B. Judicial Review as a Protection of the Separation of Powers
An independent federal agency89 that exercises executive, legislative and judicial
power 90 in excess of the authority delegated to it by Congress presents a threat to the
doctrine of separation of powers.91 The fundamental structure of government delegates
certain powers to particular branches and, through tradition and expertise, a particular
branch becomes the most capable of handling its specific area of responsibility.92 An
agency’s success rests on an internal system of checks and balances between the
agency’s simultaneous legislative, executive and judicial functions. An agency that acts
outside its legislative authority represents an avenue for the government to act beyond
the will of the people, immune from external checks on overreaching power.93
The court’s holding in Lutheran Church94 suggests that judicial review can be a
valuable check95 in the checks and balance system that belies the notion of separation of
powers. Chief Justice Edwards’ dissent to the decision against a rehearing concluded
that the circuit court was “forcing the square peg of the Commission’s regulations into
the round hole of the Adarand analysis.”96 The judicial force exerted in Lutheran
Church97 was necessary to keep the FCC within its scope of authority under the
Communications Act of 1934.98
89

The Court’s ruling in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(upholding the limitation on the President’s power of removal of the commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission as constitutional), established the constitutionality of independent
federal agencies.
90
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (recognizing the “twilight zone” where
legislative, executive and judicial actions merge together).
91
Peter S. Guryan, Reconsidering FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund Through a Bolstered
Functionalism, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1338, 1346 (1996) (stating “Independent agencies do not
present any constitutional infirmities as long as the balance of power between the three
branches is maintained and the branches’ core functions are preserved.”).
92
See infra notes 93, 94 and accompanying text.
93
Schwartz, supra note 76, at 595; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356 (James
Madison) (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961) (recognizing
the Legislature as the most powerful branch of government).
94
141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
95
Bernard Schwartz, “Shooting the Piano Player?” Justice Scalia and Administrative
Law, 47 A DMIN. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1995) (pointing out Scalia’s suggestion that the Constitution
does not provide for judicial review of all constitutional claims, the decision is for the
Congress to make not the Court). Contra, Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(frustrating judicial review jeopardizes human rights and fundamental freedom); Fleming v.
Moberly Milk Prods., 160 F.2d 259, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (finding an elimination of judicial
power leaves only executive self-restraint).
96
Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d. 487, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
97
141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
98
The FCC is limited to regulate within the scope of the public interest. Under “public
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In the past the Supreme Court has struggled to establish a clear standard for judicial
review 99 in separation of powers cases.100 The Court’s major separation of powers
decisions can be categorized as either following a formalist or functionalist101 approach
and the headless fourth branch of government102 presents problems under either
interpretation. An independent agency is contrary to the formalist, strict separation of
judicial, legislative and executive power.103 Under a functionalist approach, the
agency’s existence is permissible, but only to the degree it remains separate from the
core functions of the three branches.104
interest” its EEO racial classifications cannot represent a compelling state interest narrowly
tailored to achieve a legitimate governmental objective. Id. at 353-57.
99
Alexander Dill, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After Chadha: A Case for the
Delegation Doctrine, 33 EMORY L.J. 953, 1024-25 (1984); see Rebecca L. Brown, Separated
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1991) (stating “the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the constitutional separation of powers is an incoherent muddle.”).
100
From 1983 to the present the cases demonstrate the Court’s inability to establish one
standard applicable to the separation of powers cases. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (invalidating the legislative veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating
the provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act granting budget cutting authority to the
Comptroller General); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (finding the Independent
Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act constitutional); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (finding the U.S. Sentencing Commission constitutional); Clinton v.
New Yo rk, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (1998) (invalidating the presidential line-item veto).
101
For purposes of this analysis the terms “formalism” and “functionalism” have the
following definitions. The formalist approach uses a strict textual interpretation of the
Constitution as planning that the three branches each serves a separate and unique service
exclusively. The judicial, legislative and executive powers are independent and do not
overlap. The functionalist approach uses a liberal, flexible interpretation of the three
branches. The focus is on the core function of each branch and the degree of overlapping
which is permissible. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991) (suggesting a premise of ordered liberty to direct the Supreme Court’s
approach to the separation of powers); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984)
(suggesting movement away from formalism); Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to
Synar, 1987 BYU L. REV. 719 (1987) (discussing evolutionary and de-evolutionary trends in
the Supreme Court’s separation of powers cases); Peter S. Guryan, Reconsidering FEC v.
NRA Political Victory Fund Through a Bolstered Functionalism, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1338
(1996) (separation of powers case law demonstrates a judicial bias against congress); see
generally Schwartz, supra note 76 (examining the development of separation of powers
jurisprudence in the formalistic Burger Court and functionalist Rehnquest Court).
102
Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, SUP . CT . HIST. SOC’Y 103,
106 (Yearbook 1985).
103
See Schwartz, supra note 76, at 604.
104
Schwartz, supra note 95, at 15-16. The Lutheran Church case demonstrates the
problematic nature of agencies. A formalistic approach is dependent on the existence of an
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The court in Lutheran Church recognized that the FCC derived its authority solely
from the public interest,105 and that the public’s interest in creating program diversity is
not a compelling government interest.106 The racial classifications required under the
present EEO regulations fail under a strict scrutiny review for three reasons. First, the
regulations are designed to remedy a societal discrimination that fails to rise to the level
of a compelling government interest.107 Second, there is no direct causal connection
between the regulations and the governmental objective of program diversity if the hired
minorities fail to impact the viewpoints expressed on the airwaves.108 Lastly, the
minorities who can impact on-air viewpoints may further fail to present the viewpoints
that are necessary to create program diversity.109
Judicial review of the EEO regulations served as a necessary check on congressional
power to regulate the broadcast industry.110 The internal checks and balances within
the FCC failed to produce a constitutional regulation.111 The court recognized that
permitting a remand to allow the application of the modified policy statement would not
be sufficient, in light of the FCC’s unwillingness to admit the unconstitutionality of its
regulation.112
internal system of checks and balances within an agency. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, at 419-22
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The blend of legislative, executive and judicial functions enabled the
FCC to create and enforce unconstitutional EEO regulations. Id. A functionalist approach is
dependent on an agency functioning within its authorized purpose. Schwartz, supra note 95,
at 3-6. The FCC functions as a legislative tool to regulate the airwaves. It’s EEO regulations,
however, functioned like an EEOC affirmative action regulation. The FCC was not created for
this function and lacks the procedural safeguards necessary to ensure the proper application
of an affirmative action regulation.
105
Lutheran Church, 141 F3d. 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The court rejected the Department
of Justice suggestion that the FCC regulations were based on diversity in programming and
the prevention of employment discrimination. Id.
106
Id. at 354. (“We do not think diversity can be elevated to the ‘compelling’ level,
particularly when the Court has given every indication of wanting to cut back Metro
Broadcasting.”).
107
City of Richmond v. Cronson, 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989); see supra notes 28, 30; see also
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 355-56.
108
See supra notes 59, 60 and the accompanying text.
109
Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 618-19 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting);
see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
110
See supra note 98 and the accompanying text.
111
See supra note 54 and the accompanying text.
112
In Sable Communications Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), the Court invalidated a
prohibition of indecent but not obscene adult telephone messages and stated the judiciary’s
duty “[t]o the extent that the federal parties suggest that we should defer to Congress’
conclusion about an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that while we do not ignore it,
it is our task in the end to decide whether Congress has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 129.
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C. The Future for the FCC’s EEO Regulations
The future use of the FCC’s race classifications is dependent on the agency’s ability
to find a legitimate basis to support this type of regulation within the scope of the public
interest. The court in Lutheran Church instructed the FCC to determine if it has the
“authority to promulgate an employment non-discrimination rule.”113 The FCC is
limited to the authority granted in the Communication Act of 1934. A revision of the
current regulatory scheme may present a regulation that could withstand the first prong
of a strict scrutiny analysis, a compelling governmental interest, but will fail to present a
narrowly tailored means under the scope of the public’s interest. Without a direct
nexus between the compelling interest of program diversity and the FCC’s EEO
regulations, there is no guarantee that even a station acting within the regulations will
accomplish program diversity.114
A race-based regulation aimed at preventing discrimination in employment
throughout the broadcast industry may serve a remedial purpose. 115 First, the FCC
needs to conduct an expansive study expending time, labor and funds to produce
documentation to prove past discrimination existed in the broadcast industry. Second,
the FCC needs to identify the particular viewpoints that are lacking in the programming.
Even accomplishing these two tasks, the main obstacle to the FCC implementing an
EEO regulation based on race classifications is in establishing a legitimate link, a direct
nexus, between hiring minorities and the viewpoints that result from an increase of
minorities in the workforce. The FCC must demonstrate that increasing the
representation of minorities in the workforce will successfully provide the lacking
programming viewpoints that non-minorities failed to provide.
V. CONCLUSION

The panel distinguished the FCC’s remand request in Lutheran Church from the type of
remand request it granted in Sable on the grounds of the Commission’s willingness to doubt
the constitutionality of its own policy. Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d. 487, 489-90 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
113
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 356.
114
The court in Lutheran Church stated the “[FCC]’s purported goal of making a single
station all things to all people makes no sense.” Id. at 355-56.
115
Metro, 497 U.S. at 611 (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (“The FCC and Congress may yet
conclude after suitable examination that narrowly tailored race-conscious measures are
required to remedy discrimination that may be identified in the allocation of broadcasting
licenses.”); see Barthwell Evans, supra note 29, at 411 (finding that minority preference is
necessary to address past discrimination and to ensure that minority views are represented
on the airways); Brunson, supra note 29, at 100 (failing to enforce EEO regulations resulted in
a history of sanctioned discrimination in the broadcast industry).
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It has been suggested that to allow independent agencies to exist as protectors of the
separation of powers doctrine and to charge the courts with the duty of ensuring that
the same agencies do not overstep their authority are two very different things.116 The
court’s duty is particularly difficult when the authority of the agency is as broadly
defined as the scope of the public’s interest.117 The court in Lutheran Church118
exercised its duty by refusing to remand the case to further administrative proceedings
while the appeal was pending. The FCC is an extension of the Executive branch of
government, exercising authority delegated by the Legislative branch through hearings
modeled after the Judicial branch. If this square peg119 is to fit within the three rings
of government, judicial review must ensure that the addition does not upset the balance
of power between the branches of government.
Pamela J. Holder

116

Schwartz, supra note 76, at 587-96.
Id.
118
141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
119
Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d 495, 500 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
117
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